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INTRODUCTION
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . . .1
Purpose: This Article is a descriptive analysis of the U.N. Consolidated 
List that designates individuals and entities as terrorists or as terrorist 
financers.  Further the Article shows the lack of substantive and procedural 
standards in the listing and delisting process, and in turn, questions the 
approach of proscribing as undertaken by the supranational body. 
Context: Levi and Reuter explain the anti-money laundering/terrorist 
finance regime as comprising two basic pillars: prevention and 
enforcement.2  The prevention pillar is designed to deter criminals from 
using financial institutions, and the enforcement pillar is designed to punish 
criminals when, despite prevention efforts, they have successfully laundered 
those proceeds.3  The following analysis can be conceptually viewed as 
bridging the two pillars. 
To further conceptualize this analysis, the KPMG research should be 
noted.  This research polled 209 financial institutions and found that the 
majority, 83%, are investing an average of 61% more since September 11, 
2001 on compliance costs for money laundering/terrorist financing 
regulation.4  Furthermore, they expect spending to increase by an additional 
40% over the next three years and transaction monitoring activity has been 
the main cause of increased spending over the past three years.5
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (the 
“9/11 Commission”) and a monograph prepared by the staff of the 
 1. U.N. Charter pmbl. (italics omitted). 
 2. Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289, 297 
(2006). 
 3. Id.
 4. KPMG INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2004: HOW 
BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 9 (2004), 
http://kpmg.com/cy/_metacanvas/attach_handler.uhtml?attach_id=48&content_type=applicat
ion/pdf. 
The results of the survey clearly showed that transaction monitoring, 
both through new automated systems and upgrades and via 
customization of existing systems, has made the greatest contribution 
to increased AML spending over the past three years; respondents 
also anticipate that transaction monitoring will continue to be the 
most significant factor in future spending on AML questions. 
Id. at 22.
 5. Id. at 5, 22. 
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Commission entitled Terrorist Financing Monograph6 explained that from a 
financial institution’s operational perspective, transaction monitoring is 
done at two points: at the front-end and in the back office.  In the back 
office, analysts are aided significantly by software that is programmed to 
catch “anomalies” (i.e., unusual financial transactions).7  The software, 
considered the “interdiction” or “filtering” computer software, works like a 
spell-check feature of a word processing program, which once installed, 
monitors every transaction, filtering out those that contain a name or 
information field (i.e., date of birth or place of birth) that matches those for 
which it was instructed to search.8  The authoritative Interlaken Process 
recommends that regulating agencies encourage the computer software 
practice by considering its use as a mitigating factor when assessing fines 
for violations.9
Thus, from the financial institution perspective, to a significant extent, 
operationally, detecting terrorist financing amounts to a process of 
matching names against their financial database on specific requests by the 
authorities,10 or routinely matching their database of customers against 
updated terrorist/terrorist financers lists.11
 6. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 55 (2004), 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf. 
 7. Id.
 8. THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: A
MANUAL FOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 101 (2001).
 9. Id.
 10. See Mark Pieth, Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
1074, 1077, 1085 (2006) (noting similarly that for detecting terrorist financing, financial 
services providers have argued that, at most, they are able to check names against Lists); 
John Byrne, Banks and the USA Patriot Act, 9 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 18, 21 (2004).  
For example, according to FinCEN, between April 1, 2003, and April 26, 2004, 
the Internal Revenue Service submitted 16 requests to FinCEN pertaining to 66 
individuals and 17 businesses. These requests generated 646 positive matches 
with more than 1,274 financial institutions. Since Section 314(a)’s creation, the 
system has been used to send the names of 1,547 persons suspected of terrorism 
financing or money laundering to more than 26,000 financial institutions and has 
produced 10,560 matches that were passed on to law enforcement. 
Id.
 11. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CANADA, MONTHLY 
REPORTING TO OSFI ON LIST OF NAMES SUBJECT TO THE REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING A LIST 
OF ENTITIES MADE UNDER SUBSECTION 83.05(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE AND/OR THE 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUPPRESSION OF 
TERRORISM (RIUNRST) AND/OR UNITED NATIONS AL-QAIDA AND TALIBAN REGULATIONS 
(UNAQTR) (2007), http://www.ofsi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/issues/terrorism/ 
reminders/2007_05_31_e.pdf (showing the updated reminder regarding the designated 
individuals/entities as terrorist financers is addressed to All Banks, Federally Regulated Trust 
& Loan Companies, Federally Regulated Life Insurance Companies, Federally Regulated 
Property & Casualty Insurance Companies, Federally Regulated Cooperative Credit 
Associations, Fraternal Benefit Societies, etc . . .). 
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Clearly, the most important list of our times is the U.N. Consolidated 
List (“Consolidated List” or “List”) since it is enforced in principle by the 
complete U.N. membership consisting of 192 States.  This List, designating 
individuals and entities as terrorists or as financers of terrorism, is 
formulated by the U.N. Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee 
(“Committee”).  The following is a detailed descriptive analysis of the 
Consolidated List and the process undertaken by the Committee during the 
formulation.  Notwithstanding justifications that the listing process is 
confidential, being based on intelligence,12 empirical reality finds that the 
listing process is simply one that lacks substantive and procedural standards.  
In addition, countless other tensions define the working of the Committee 
and in turn, have an enormous impact on its crystallized output — the 
Consolidated List. 
Part I of this Article details the different U.N. Resolutions creating the 
Committee and highlights certain other relevant aspects.  Part II analyzes 
several fundamental issues and tensions that surround the Committee: it 
provides a Committee overview and analyzes the dividing tensions among 
Committee members and the nature of the Consolidated List, the U.N. 
membership obligations vis-à-vis the enforcement of the instrument as of 
the “highest national interest,” and the evolving nature and reach of the List.  
Part III analyzes the procedural and substantive listing and delisting 
procedures.  In addition, related issues such as justifications and lack of 
identifiers are explained.  This Article concludes by stating the results of the 
measures and questions the approach of proscribing individuals and entities 
on the List. 
I. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS
A. Security Council Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999) 
The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267,13
demanding that the Taliban cease its activities in support of international 
terrorism and insisting that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden14 to 
 12. See generally Anonymous, International Legal Developments Sub-group 1: 
Critical Review of Terrorist-Related Legislation and the Monitoring of New Legislation, 6 J.
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 201 (2003); William Allen, The War Against Terrorism 
Financing, 6 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 306 (2003); Steve Kiser, Financing Terror: 
An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure (Sept. 2004) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD185.pdf; Fletcher N. 
Baldwin, Jr., Money Laundering Countermeasures with Primary Focus upon Terrorism and 
the USA Patriot Act 2001, 6 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 105 (2002).  
 13. See U.N. SCOR, 4051 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV/4051 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 14. In the following analysis, “Usama bin Laden” and “Al-Qa’idah” are spelled 
inconsistently because they reflect the inconsistency that exists in the various U.N. 
documents. 
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appropriate authorities to bring him to justice.15  To enforce the demands, 
the Security Council imposed a flight ban on any aircraft owned, leased, or 
operated by or on behalf of the Taliban.16  Further, it ordered the freezing of 
the organization’s financial resources.17
The Resolution established a Sanctions Committee composed of the 
fifteen Security Council members to ensure implementation of measures, to 
designate funds or other financial resources of the Taliban, and to consider 
requests for exemptions from the measures imposed.18
B. Security Council Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000) 
In Resolution 1333 the Security Council imposed an arms embargo over 
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.19  Further, it 
expanded the air embargo and financial embargo to include freezing the 
funds of Usama Bin Laden and associates.20  It requested the Committee to 
maintain an updated list of suspect individuals and entities, including 
Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization.21  On March 8, 2001, the 
Committee published its first Consolidated List designating terrorists and 
terrorist financers.22  The Resolution further mandated the Committee to 
maintain a list of agencies providing humanitarian aid in Afghanistan.23
C. Security Council Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) 
The 1363 Resolution established a mechanism to monitor the 
implementation of the measures imposed by Resolutions 1267 and 1333.24
Since 2001, the monitoring mechanism’s configuration has changed as new 
 15. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶¶ 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (establishing the 
Security Council Committee and imposing limited air embargo and financial embargo on the 
Taliban). 
 16. Id. ¶ 4(a). 
 17. Id. ¶ 4(b). 
 18. Id. ¶ 6. 
 19. S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 5(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000), (expanding the 
air embargo and financial embargo to include freezing the funds of Usama Bin Laden and 
associates, imposing an arms embargo over the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the 
Taliban and embargo on the chemical acetic anhydride). 
 20. Id. ¶¶ 8(c), 11. 
 21. Id. ¶ 8(c). 
 22. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Concerning 
Afghanistan Issues List Pursuant to Paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 1333, U.N. Doc. AFG/150-
SC/7166 (Aug. 10, 2001); U.N. Security Council Comm., The Consolidated List, U.N. Doc. 
SC/7028 (Mar. 8, 2001) [hereinafter The Consolidated List]. 
 23. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 19, ¶ 12. 
 24. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 19, ¶ 15; see generally, S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 
15.  
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members have been appointed or the mandate renewed.25  For example, 
initially in 2001 they were called the “Committee of Experts,” and from 
2001 to 2003 the mechanism was called the “Monitoring Group.”26  The 
Committee of Experts and the Monitoring Group submitted four reports 
before their mandate lapsed.27  Via Resolution 1526,28 the experts’ title was 
changed to the “Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.”29
This group has submitted eight reports, the most recent dated May 14, 
2008.30  Regardless of the configuration or titles, all experts share the same 
mandate — to assist the Committee and to monitor compliance for 
strengthening the measures.  The terms used in this analysis are 
“Monitoring Team” or “Experts.” 
D. Resolution 1617 (July 29, 2005) 
In Resolution 1617, the Security Council provided a definition of the 
term “associated with” and called for member States to submit checklist 
provisions when submitting a name to be included on the List.  It requested 
 25. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1455, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 
1735, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
 26. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1363, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001); S.C. Res. 
1390, ¶¶ 7, 9–10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, supra note 25, ¶¶ 
7–10, 12–14. 
 27. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/511 (May 22, 2001); 
The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 14 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Afghanistan, U.N. 
Doc. S/2002/65 (Jan. 14, 2002); The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 16 December 2002 
from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1267 Addressed to the President of the Security Council Containing the First Report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390, U.N. Doc. S/2002/541 (May 15, 2002) 
[hereinafter Dec. 2002 Letter]; The Res. 1267 Chairman, Second Report of the Monitoring 
Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 and Extended by 
Resolution 1390, at 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1050 (Sept. 20, 
2002) [hereinafter Monitoring Group Second Report]; The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter 
Dated 19 September 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1050 (Sept. 20, 
2002) [hereinafter Sept. 2002 Letter]; The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 16 December 
2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 Addressed to the President of the Security Council Containing the Third 
Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1338 (Dec. 
17, 2002). 
 28. S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
 30. The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 13 May 2008 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/324 (May 14, 2008). 
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that the Secretary-General extend the mandate of the Monitoring Team by 
seventeen months.31
E. Resolution 1730 (December 19, 2006) 
Resolution 1730 established the Focal Point within the Secretariat to 
receive delisting requests and directed the Committee to revise guidelines 
accordingly.32
II. THE COMMITTEE AND THE CONSOLIDATED LIST
A. The Sanctions Committee 
1. Membership and Decision-Making Process 
The Committee consists of the Security Council members.  Guidelines 
suggest that all decisions are made by complete consensus among the fifteen 
Committee members.33  Although the composition of the Committee is the 
same as the Security Council (i.e., five permanent and ten non-permanent 
members), an important difference in the decision making process exists.  In 
the Security Council, decisions can be made by majority vote that should 
include the concurring votes of all five permanent members (i.e., no 
permanent member should veto a decision).  This is the rule of “Great 
Power Unanimity.”34  However, in the Committee, consisting of the very 
same members as the Security Council, any member (not just a permanent 
member, but any of the fifteen members) can veto a decision or place a 
“hold.”35
When a member places a “hold” concerning any issue, whether 
procedural or substantive, there is no statutory limit for resolution, though 
the hold ceases to have effect when a non-permanent member’s membership 
on the Committee expires.36  Since the Resolutions are silent about the time 
limit, operationally, an interpretation of a two-year period is feasible (i.e., 
the non-permanent membership duration); alternatively, the interpretation 
could also indicate a lengthier period, given the affiliations and relationships 
among Committee members (i.e., an incoming member can continue a hold 
placed by an outgoing member).
 31. S.C. Res. 1617, ¶¶ 1–2, 10, 19–21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). 
 32. S.C. Res. 1730, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006). 
 33. U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the 
Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ 
1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
 34. See Membership in 2009, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 
2009).  
 35. Guidelines, supra note 33, ¶ 4. 
 36. Id.
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Decisions are made during regular meetings, by special meetings, or by a 
written “no–objection” process within a fixed time period, five days or 
shorter if decided by the Chairman.37  All meetings of the Committee are 
closed sessions.38  The Committee meets formally or informally.39
Decisions are adopted in formal meetings only; whereas the informal 
meetings, undertaken regularly, serve as a forum for debate and 
discussions.40  Also, an extra cost is involved in the formal meetings due to 
the use of interpreters in the six official U.N. languages. 
2. Scope and Duties 
Initially, the Committee was merely a conduit of information.  It reported 
to the Security Council the U.N. member States’ actions undertaken in 
compliance with the sanction measures.41  However, over time, conforming 
to the widening scope of the sanction measures, the Committee’s scope 
evolved.  For example, initially the Resolution 1267 was limited to targeting 
the Taliban.42  Resolution 1333 widened the scope to include Usama bin 
Laden and individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida.43  On July 29, 
2005, by Resolution 1617, the Security Council further widened the scope 
by providing a definition of “associated with.”44  Concurrent with the 
evolving Resolutions, the Committee mandate magnified, from originally 
reporting issues regarding the Taliban, to maintaining a list designating 
individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and finally, to designating 
terrorists globally. 
The duties of the Committee can be divided into listing and delisting; 
monitoring  sanctions, compliance, and “capacity building” among U.N. 
members;  accepting reports from States and formulating reports for the 
Security Council; and advising.45
The Committee’s mandate includes the formulation and maintenance of 
various lists, all of which are evolving and open.  An “open list” empowers 
States to act before the issuance of the Committee list within the categories 
 37. Id. at 4(a). 
 38. Id. at 3(b). 
 39. Id. at 3(a). 
 40. Some kinds of meetings and procedures followed by the U.N. organs include (1) 
‘Open meetings’ that are formal and open to the public, (2) ‘Arria meetings’ that are un-
minuted and considered “non-meetings”, (3) ‘Closed meetings’ wherein the Chatham House 
Rule applies. At Closed meetings, participants do not disclose specific positions taken by 
others and details of the meeting are not given; broad points are merely stated.  Reforming 
the United Nations, High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society: Security Council Relations with 
Civil Society, http://www.un.org/reform/civilsociety/pdfs/sc.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
 41. See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 15, ¶ 6. 
 42. See id. ¶¶ 1–4. 
 43. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 19, ¶ 8. 
 44. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31, ¶ 2. 
 45. Guidelines, supra note 33, ¶¶ 4(a)–(d), (k). 
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of targets established by the resolution or to go beyond when a State 
suspects that targeted assets are within its jurisdiction.46  Some controversy 
and criticism is attached to most lists.  Primarily, concerns relate to the lack 
of transparency, the secrecy surrounding the rationale for designations, and 
the violation of human rights.47
Perhaps the least controversial is the list maintained for all landing areas 
for aircraft within the territory of Afghanistan under control of the Taliban48
or the list detailing agencies and organizations that provide humanitarian aid 
and assistance in Afghanistan.49  A somewhat controversial list is the 
humanitarian exceptions list.50  Conceivably, the most controversial is the 
Consolidated List that lists and delists individual or entities as terrorists or 
the financers of terrorism.51  Lastly, the Committee is required to make 
periodic reports, every 120 days, to the Security Council regarding all 
lists.52
3. Dividing Tensions Reflected in the Consolidated List 
Severe tensions among members define the work of the Committee.  
Because the Committee makes decisions by complete consensus, due to 
members’ differing priorities or interests, often it is unable to make any
decision.53  The consensus process, therefore, can be viewed as serving as 
an effective restraint or check in the decision making process, since every 
 46. BIERSTEKER & ECKART, supra note 8, at 7–8.
 47. See generally José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J.
OF INT’L L. 873 (2003); Jane Stromseth, The Security Council’s Antiterrorism Role: 
Continuity and Innovation, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 41 (2003); Elin Miller, The Use of 
Targeted Sanctions in the Fight Against International Terrorism: What About Human 
Rights?, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (2003); E. Alexandra Dosman, For the Record: 
Designating ‘Listed Entities’ for the Purpose of Terrorist Financing Offences at Canadian 
Law, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1 (2004); Eric Rosand, The Security Council’s Efforts to 
Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda / Taliban Sanctions, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 333 (2003). 
 48. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 19, ¶ 16(a). 
 49. Id. ¶ 16(d). 
 50. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 15, ¶ 6(a). 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. 
 52. Guidelines, supra note 33. 
 53. See U.N. Sec. Council, Letter Dated 1 December 2005 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/761 (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 2005 Letter].  “As 
at 1 November 2005, the addition of 139 individuals and 1 entity, submitted to it over the 
past years, is pending Committee approval. The Committee is also still considering more 
than 500 technical corrections submitted to it by the Monitoring Team.”  Id. at 2; see 
generally U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Res. 1267, Report of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, U.N. Doc. S/2006/22 (Jan. 17, 
2006) [hereinafter Sec. Council Committee Report Concerning Al-Qaida]. 
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Committee member must be satisfied, or conversely, can hijack the 
Committee’s work, for precisely the same reason. 
Contrasting stances among the Committee members, and by extension, 
the U.N. member States, are highly visible.  While no State wants to seem 
soft on issues regarding terrorism, and all 192 U.N. members concur that it 
is a serious global threat,54 the Consolidated List, considered the core or 
“the operational centerpiece”55 of sanctions measures, is viewed differently 
by various Committee members. 
On one side of the spectrum are those that take a hard-line stance and do 
not want to seem accommodating or soft on any issue,56 and at the other end 
are those member States that attempt to deal with issues regarding terrorism 
within the framework of human rights.57  The first group views the 
Consolidated List as a punishing and repressive instrument, whereas the 
second, as a reformatory and progressive measure. 
The group taking a hard-line stance views the List as exemplary, with the 
obligation to impose restrictions on all persons and entities they have 
identified as members of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, even prior to being added 
by the Committee to the List.58  Additionally, the group focuses on placing 
individuals on the List, is opposed to delisting an individual on the 
assumption that an individual would return to terrorism if delisted. The 
group is against delisting a deceased person’s name on the assumption that 
the deceased’s funds or travel documents may be misused for future 
criminal activity.59
 54. The U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006). 
 55. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5104th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5104 (Dec. 17, 2004) 
(statement of Mr. Pleuger, Germany). 
 56. See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5375th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5375 (Feb. 21, 2006); 
U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5446th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5446 (May 30, 2006); U.N. SCOR, 
61st Sess., 5538th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5538 (Sept. 28, 2006). 
 57. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5168th mtg., at 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5169 (Apr. 25, 
2005). 
Briefings by Chairmen of Subsidiary  Bodies of the Security 
Council, Statement of Mr. Hoscheit, Luxembourg, on behalf of the 
European Union: The EU is convinced that efforts to combat 
terrorism must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Counter-terrorism actions must at all times be accompanied by the 
respect of due process and the rule of law. There can be no trade-off 
between human rights and effective security measures. Indeed, 
respect for human rights must remain an integral part of any global 
counter-terrorism strategy. 
Id.
 58. Sept. 2002 Letter, supra note 27, ¶ 21. 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 21–43; see generally The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 20 December 
2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals, ¶ 10, 
U.N. Doc. S/2006/046 (Dec. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Dec. 2006 Letter]. 
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The second group, which views the List as a reformatory and progressive 
measure, considers human rights and fundamental freedoms as an integral 
part of any global counter-terrorism strategy; they restrict the application of 
measures only to the specific person or entity identified in the List.60
Furthermore, they support the delisting of individuals who have renounced 
terrorism, the removal of the names of the deceased, and the removal of 
names that lack sufficient identifiers.61
An example demonstrating this stance was the German terrorist trial, 
wherein a court in Düsseldorf convicted four Arab men of planning attacks 
on Jewish sites in Germany.62  The media report suggests most of the 
evidence came from a fifth member of al-Tawhid, who admitted to plotting 
the attacks after the men were arrested in April 2002, and described links 
with Al-Qaida.63  In return, he got a reduced sentence in 2003 and was then 
released into Germany’s witness-protection program.64  Further, in 
December 2004, the U.N. Committee delisted the individual at the request 
of the German government.65
Quite clearly the dividing tensions among Committee members have a 
profound impact on the implementation of the Consolidated List.  Perhaps 
the most obvious result of tensions is the confusion regarding the nature of 
the instrument.  Another is the nature of obligations imposed on the U.N. 
membership due to the instrument.  The following analysis explores these 
issues and explains how the List is interpreted diversely amongst the U.N. 
membership.  Moreover, it is shown that, though the nature of the 
instrument is unclear, in stark contrast is the clarity vis-à-vis the 
instrument’s enforcement obligations placed on the entire U.N. 
membership.  The analysis also explores the List’s layout, scope, and reach. 
B. The Consolidated List 
1. Structure and Composition 
The Consolidated List is composed of five sections, as described below.  
Each section arranged in alphabetical order.  Each name is numbered; 
however, numbers are not permanently assigned to a proscribed name.  The 
numbers change with every new addition or deletion because new names are 
 60. Sept. 2002 Letter, supra note 27, ¶ 19; U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5375th mtg., at 5, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5375 (Feb. 21, 2006). 
 61. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5168th mtg., at 20–23, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5168 (Apr. 25, 
2005). 
 62. Germany Convicts Terror Plotters, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4377808.stm.  
 63. Id.
 64. See id.; Janie Ho, Germans Cut Deal with Terrorist, CBS NEWS, Nov. 26, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/26/terror/main585734.shtml. 
 65. See The Consolidated List, supra note 22.  
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inserted based upon alphabetical order.66  Until December 2006, the 
Consolidated List was printed in only one of the six official U.N. languages 
— English.  As the results of the measure shows, these apparently trivial 
details have serious consequences for both the proscribed individuals on the 
List and those obligated with enforcing the measure. 
As of December 12, 2006, the Consolidated List was comprised of 487
entries: Section A listed 142 individuals belonging to or associated with the 
Taliban; Section B showed 1 entity belonging to or associated with the 
Taliban; Section C named 220 individuals belonging to or associated with 
Al-Qaida; Section D listed 124 entities belonging to or associated with Al-
Qaida; and Section E included 19 individuals and entities previously 
belonging to any of the above four categories, but now removed from the 
list(s).67
Following each update, a listing, delisting, or amendment, the 
Committee issues a press release, circulates a Note Verbale to the State 
missions, e-mails changes to U.N. member States, and transmits a hard copy 
of the List on a quarterly basis.68  Currently, e-mails are sent to 342 contact 
points provided by member States and relevant international and regional 
organizations.69
2. Nature of the Instrument 
The Consolidated List is an unusually complex (in derivation and use) 
instrument of significant symbolic value.  The Monitoring Team views it as 
 66. U.N. Sec. Council, Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1526 Concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, in letter dated 14 February 2000 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/83 (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
Second Report]. 
 67. Consolidated List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with 
Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, 
Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them, http://www.un.org/sc/ 
committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf (source is updated as the list is updated, last 
updated Jan. 25, 2010). 
 68. The Res. 1267 Chairman, Report of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated 
Individuals and Entities, ¶ 18, in letter dated 20 December 2002 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Individuals and Entities Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/1039 (Dec. 31, 2004). 
 69. Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53, ¶ 15; The Res. 1267 Chairman, Report of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, ¶ 14, in letter dated 29 January 
2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and 
Entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/59 (Feb. 7, 
2007) [hereinafter Jan. 2007 Letter]. 
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“an expression of the resolve of the international community to defeat 
terrorism . . . .  Alongside the twelve thematic conventions against 
terrorism, and in the absence of a universally agreed definition of terrorism, 
the List stands both as a symbol of international resolve and as a practical 
measure to address the global challenge to international peace and 
security.”70  Indeed, “in the absence of an agreed upon definition of 
terrorism, the Consolidated List provides the only consensus on what Al-
Qaida comprises.”71  Moreover, the Monitoring Team states that the List 
acts as a deterrent as well as a preventative measure.72
Some U.N. members add that the List is not a political tool,73 but a legal 
one.74  Others note that it is “designed to serve as an operational tool for the 
enforcement of the assets freeze, the travel ban, and the arms embargo.”75
Yet others view it as the most effective instrument in the Security Council’s 
campaign against threats to international peace and security stemming from 
terrorism.76  Seemingly, all agree that the Consolidated List is the most 
essential instrument implementing the sanctions regime.77  However, none 
of the Resolutions clarify its nature or purpose. 
3. Debate Between Administrative or Punitive Nature of the 
List
The Resolutions are silent about the nature and purpose of the 
instrument; however, the Monitoring Team insists that the List is not a 
criminal instrument.  It interprets it as a deterrent, preventive, and 
administrative measure.78  It suggests that the List is an administrative 
 70. Second Report, supra note 66. 
 71. Id.; see generally The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 23 August 2004 from 
the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. S/2004/679 (Aug. 25, 2004) 
[hereinafter Aug. 2004 Letter]. 
 72. U.N. Sec. Council, Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction 
Monitoring Team, in letter dated 2 September 2005 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities addressed to the Present of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/572 (Sept. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Third Report]. 
 73. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5104th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5104 (Dec. 17, 2004) 
(see German statement). 
 74. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5538th mtg., at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5538 (Sept. 28, 
2006) (see Qatar statement). 
 75. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5104th mtg., supra note 73, at 18 (see German 
statement). 
 76. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4976th mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4976 (May 25, 
2004) (see Russian Federation statement). 
 77. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5538th mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5538 (Sept. 28, 
2006) (see Russian Federation statement.). 
 78. Third Report, supra note 72, ¶ 41 (“After all, the sanctions do not impose a 
criminal punishment or procedure, such as detention, arrest or extradition, but instead apply 
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measure, not a criminal instrument.79  “A criminal conviction or indictment 
is not a prerequisite for inclusion on the Consolidated List; the actions of an 
individual or entity in support of Al-Qaida or the Taliban — whether or not 
criminalized or admissible as evidence in a particular State — will continue 
to provide the basis for inclusion on the List” and “regardless of whether 
any authority has formally charged them with a criminal offence.”80
The interpretation is shared by the Committee in virtually the same 
words:  
There seems to be a general misunderstanding in some Member States that 
national criminal proceedings are necessary in order to freeze assets . . . .  
The Committee also notes that criminal conviction or indictment is not a 
prerequisite for inclusion on the consolidated list, and member States need 
not wait until national administrative, civil or criminal proceedings can be 
brought or concluded against an individual or entity before proposing a 
name for the [C]onsolidated [L]ist.81
[Hence t]he Committee strongly believes that no reason is good enough to 
justify delays in the submission of new names or further identifying 
information on the names already on its list. In this regard, the Committee 
wishes to stress again that no criminal conviction is required for the 
submission of names to its List.82
Regardless of these interpretations, the Consolidated List is clearly a 
punitive instrument due to the serious consequences for the listed and the 
U.N. member States enforcing the List.83  Certain U.N. members have 
expressed serious concerns and noted that while the measures are intended 
to be preventive in nature, they are punitive in effect, for the rights of 
individuals are severely affected.  In particular, the application of measures 
against individuals without possibility of review or appeal has the real 
potential to violate individual due process rights guaranteed by relevant 
instruments of international law.84  Similar concerns have been raised by the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in a report dated March 9, 
2007, wherein the Commissioner explicitly stated that the instrument is 
punitive in character.85  Based on these statements, it follows that the List is 
interpreted differently among U.N. members. 
administrative measures such as freezing assets, prohibiting international travel and 
precluding arms sales.”). 
 79. Id. ¶ 41.
 80. Id. ¶¶ 41, 39. 
 81. Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53. 
 82. Dec. 2006 Letter, supra note 59. 
 83. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5229 (July 20, 2005). 
 84. Id.
 85. U.N High Comm’r for Human Rights, Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 60/241 of 15 March 2005 Entitled “Human Rights Council,” ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/88 (Mar. 9, 2007). 
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The reason for the diverse interpretations deserves consideration.  A 
possible explanation for the classification of the instrument as an 
administrative and preventive measure, as opposed to a criminal and penal 
instrument, could be that the Security Council is a political institution, not a 
court of law; therefore, it lacks the necessary qualifications for properly 
conducting criminal proceedings.86
Moreover, as the landmark Fassbender study87 noted, the classification as 
a criminal and penal instrument would have significant consequences not 
only in terms of the comparatively higher standards relating to criminal 
offences but also of human rights to be guaranteed by the Security Council 
in international law.  In particular, the listed individuals would be entitled to 
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court or tribunal 
established by law.88  And still further, the right not to be tried or punished 
twice for the same criminal offence would have to be respected.89
However, a severe contradiction exists even in the administrative 
classification.  Presumably, the purpose of the measures when taken against 
individuals or entities is the same as when undertaken against a State under 
Chapter VII (i.e., to influence the listed individuals’/entities’ conduct for the 
purposes of maintaining or restoring international peace and security).90
The corollary, of course, is that a person must be offered an opportunity to 
demonstrate that such a change of attitude and conduct has indeed taken 
place because of the listing91 — a practice somewhat similar to that offered 
to sanctioned States.92  That is to say, minimally, from either classification 
flows review or some independent assessment regarding the listed’s conduct 
post-listing — currently, all of which are entirely absent from the measures. 
For now the debate regarding the nature of the Consolidated List is put 
aside, though it is concluded that the List is interpreted differently among 
U.N. members and it has significant symbolic value.  However, the nature 
remains unclear, although theoretically either classification (administrative 
or penal) should entail some review mechanism. 
 86. BARDO FASSBENDER, TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS: THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THAT FAIR AND CLEAR 
PROCEDURES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES TARGETED WITH 





 90. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
 91. FASSBENDER, supra note 86. 
 92. See, e.g., DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE:
ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S 13–36 (2000); GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (2d ed. 1990). 
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4. Evolving Scope and Reach 
Recall that the scope of the Committee has been evolving since 1999.
Concurrent with the Committee’s evolving scope, the scope and reach of the 
Consolidated List evolved.  Professor Cameron notes that the definition of 
“associated with” provided by Resolution 1617,93 has resulted in the scope 
of the Consolidated List being qualitatively different from its previous 
scope.  The scope is now “open-ended” and dramatically widened, unbound 
by geography.94  The Monitoring Team justifies the evolution as reflecting 
the “geographic diversity of the threat posed by Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and 
associated groups” while observing that “the most recent additions to the 
List include Al Qaida-associated terrorists and terrorist groups operating in 
Central, South and South-east Asia and the Middle East, including Iraq.”95
5. Obligations Imposed on U.N. Member States 
Professor Fassbender authored the study entitled Targeted Sanctions and
Due Process,96 commissioned by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs.  One 
purpose of the study was to analyze the nature of obligations imposed on 
U.N. member States under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.97  In addition, 
the study addressed a significant number of procedural and substantive 
issues regarding listing of individuals and entities by the U.N.  In the 
context of the nature of obligations placed on U.N. member States under 
Chapter VII, the study concluded that U.N. member States do not possess 
any discretionary rights.  They must comply with the terms of the Council 
resolutions as they stand.98
Perhaps the interpretation is necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security as the U.N. Charter states.99  However, a 
strict interpretation could also be problematic since the primary 
responsibility for enforcing the measures lies with the U.N. members.  
 93. S.C. Resolution 1617, supra note 31, ¶ 2. 
 94. IAIN CAMERON, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: DUE PROCESS 
AND UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM SANCTIONS 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/public_international_law/ 
Texts_&_Documents/Docs%202006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf (“in contrast to 
earlier targeted sanction, involves a qualitative difference in that there is no connection 
between the targeted group/individuals and any territory or state”). 
 95. Third Report, supra note 72, ¶¶ 10, 21–22. 
 96. FASSBENDER, supra note 86. 
 97. The Fassbender study addressed the following question: “Is the UN Security 
Council, by virtue of applicable rules of international law, in particular the United Nations 
Charter, obliged to ensure that rights of due process, or ‘fair and clear procedures,’ are made 
available to individuals and entities directly targeted with sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter?” Id.  Having answered this question in the affirmative, it further identified the 
rights and the options available to the Security Council to secure them.  Id.
 98. Id.
 99. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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Indeed, different sanction cases have shown that a lack of consensus among 
the enforcing States results in undermining the measures.100  Thus, from an 
operational perspective, a modest argument could be made that consent is 
important for the effective implementation of the measures.  Furthermore, 
employing a counterfactual reasoning while considering the consequences 
of lack of consent, it is suggested that the absence of consent may prove 
problematic because, operationally, even non-consenting States are 
obligated to enforce the measures.101  Therefore, by themselves, mandatory 
obligations are insufficient to ensure enforcement.  Neither does it follow 
from the mandatory nature alone that U.N. member States, or even an 
overwhelming majority of the member States, would enforce the instrument 
effectively, or, crucially, that enforcement would be uniform among them.  
Additionally, it should be noted that mandatory obligations have put some 
States in positions that, despite best intentions, have compelled their non-
compliance.102
The Fassbender study also concluded that member States have no 
authority to review the names of individuals and entities specified by the 
responsible committee of the Security Council with the aim of ascertaining 
whether the persons and entities indeed fall under the categories defined by 
the respective Council resolution.103
The point is that theoretically Chapter VII obligations are mandatory and 
no discretion by U.N. membership is permitted while enforcing the List.  
The assumption is re-enforced by the Committee’s explicit statement: “It 
must be stressed that Member States are under an obligation to freeze assets 
as soon as an individual or entity is added to the List and that no discretion 
is left with, e.g., national courts in this regard.”104  Moreover, the Committee 
has stressed that it expects all member States to enforce sanctions “with the 
same vigour with which they approach their highest national interests.”105
Against this background we analyze the reach of the List. 
It is observed that the Consolidated List has a wide global reach.  States 
are required to circulate it as widely as possible and use it as “an 
authoritative and key reference document.”106  They are required to 
disseminate it as widely as possible to all competent authorities, including, 
 100. See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 92. 
 101. See, e.g., R.T. NAYLOR, ECONOMIC WARFARE: SANCTIONS, EMBARGO BUSTING,
AND THEIR HUMAN COST (1999). 
 102. Sept. 2002 Letter, supra note 27, ¶ 39 (citing the legal difficulties experienced by 
Luxembourg in implementing mandatory freezing of financial and economic assets of listed 
terrorists — Luxembourg has recently released assets for individuals and linked to al-
Barakaat due to lack of access to pertinent information relating to the case). 
 103. FASSBENDER, supra note 86. 
 104. Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53, at 3. 
 105. U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Res. 1267, Written 
Assessment Pursuant to Paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1617, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/1046 (Dec. 28, 2006). 
 106. Sept. 2002 Letter, supra note 27, ¶ 126. 
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but not limited to, financial institutions, border control authorities, arms 
control authorities, and administrative and judicial departments responsible 
for the identification of individuals, including the changing of names.107
In particular, the List is circulated to banks; financial institutions;  non-
banking financial institutions (such as pension, insurance, financial leasing 
companies, foreign exchange bureaus, money transmitters, securities firms, 
and credit unions); businesses; and professionals (such as accountants, 
attorneys, trust administrators, business registrars, financial advisers, 
precious commodities dealers, and real estate, tax, and travel agents); as 
well as to border points, consulates, customs agents, intelligence agencies, 
alternative remittance systems, and charities.108
As of December 2004, of the total 191 U.N. membership, 131 States had 
submitted reports regarding compliance measures developed by the states to 
meet the U.N. requirements.109 All of these reporting States claim to have 
incorporated the List and its sanctions into their legal or administrative 
regimes.110  Furthermore, “[a]nalysis of the 131 reports shows that the 
Consolidated List has been circulated to banks and non-bank financial 
institutions by 125 (95%) and 107 (82%) Member States respectively.”111  A 
report dated December 2006 notes that the number of States that circulate 
the Committee’s List to relevant authorities and agencies had reached 
169.112
Additionally, the List is incorporated into the databases of several 
international organizations, including the INTERPOL database, the Basel 
Committee,113 the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the 
International Air Transport Association.114
The checklist provisions of Resolution 1617115 further ensure compliance 
among U.N. member States.  These provisions create a general reporting 
requirement that requires “all States to complete and return to the 
Committee a brief checklist within sixty days of its notification that a new 
 107. Id.
 108. Second Report, supra note 66, ¶ 14. 
 109. The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 16 December 2004 from the Chairman of 
the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-
Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/2004/1037 (Dec. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Dec. 2004 
Letter]. 
 110. Id. ¶ 19. 
 111. Id. ¶ 24. 
 112. Dec. 2006 Letter, supra note 59, ¶ 7. 
 113. Charles Freeland, How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help Prevent 
the Misuse of Financial Institutions in the Financing of Terrorism?, in FINANCING
TERRORISM 41–48 (Mark Pieth ed., 2002). 
 114. See generally Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53; U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5538th 
mtg,, supra note 57, at 4; U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5104th mtg., at 17 U.N. Doc. S/PV.5104 
(Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil). 
 115. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31, ¶ 2, annexes I–II. 
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name(s) has been added to any internal national list or registry of 
terrorists.”116  As of September 30, 2006, fifty-five States had submitted 
their checklists conforming to these provisions.117
Leaving aside the perplexing question concerning the nature of the 
instrument, it can be concluded that the reach of the Consolidated List is 
extremely wide.  Indeed, it is the widest among all lists currently enforced 
globally.118  Although U.N. members have used different methods to 
incorporate it into the domestic regulatory systems,119 most have done so 
(i.e., 169 member States out of the total U.N. membership of 192).  These 
issues are extremely relevant within the context of the following analysis, 
which details the process whereby individuals are proscribed on this widely 
enforced measure. 
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LISTING AND DELISTING 
A. Implementation of the Consolidated List 
Substantively, there is an absence of listing standards, with the exception 
of a subjective “associated with” defined in 2005 (whereas the first List was 
formulated in 2001).  Additional problems such as lack of justifications and 
identifiers plague the listing process.  Equally problematic, the delisting 
process lacks definition in terms of criteria and process.  As a result, the 
delisting process is reduced to diplomatic maneuvering among States.  
 116. Second Report, supra note 66. 
 117. Dec. 2006 Letter, supra note 59, ¶ 5. 
 118. See Statewatch’s comparative analysis of the United States, the United 
Kingdom., United Nations, and the European Union “terrorist lists” at Statewatch 
Comparison of Lists, http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html (last visited Sept. 
6, 2009) (“This website was launched in June 2005 by Statewatch in association with the 
Campaign Against Criminalising Communities and the Human Rights and Social Justice 
Institute, London Metropolitan University, to monitor the largely secret development of the 
policy of ‘proscribing’ groups and individuals connected with ‘terrorism.’”).  According to 
this project, the following four lists proscribe individuals and entities, are globally 
recognized and enforced, and have a considerable overlap: 
First, by the United Kingdom that introduced proscription in 1974 
for organizations in Northern Ireland and then extended it to foreign 
organizations in 2000; Second, by the United States that introduced 
proscription of foreign terrorists groups in 1995; Third, by the United 
Nations that introduced the practice through the Consolidated List in 
the Taliban/Al-Qaeda Sanctions regime; Fourth, by the European 
Union, that incorporated the UN Consolidated List into the EU 
framework and then went a step further and introduced its own 
‘terrorist’ list. 
Statewatch Analysis, Terrorizing the Rule of Law: The Policy and Practice of Proscription, 
http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2009); see also 
“Terrorist” Lists Monitoring Proscription, Designation and Asset-Freezing, 
http://statewatch.org/terrorlists/listslmain.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).   
 119. See Third Report, supra note 72, ¶ 8, annex 3. 
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Perhaps the most problematic aspect of these processes is that the 
Committee is the sole and final authority with reference to all listing and 
delisting issues because no independent review mechanism exists despite 
the creation of the Focal Point. 
1. Listing Procedure 
The process of designating an individual or entity as a terrorist or a 
terrorism financer on the Consolidated List is straightforward.  The 
Guidelines suggest that any country or multiple countries can propose a 
name to be included on the List.120  The consensus of all fifteen Committee 
Members is required for listing.121  The standards for inclusion on the List 
are a bit more complicated. 
2. Standards and Justification 
Resolution 1617122 determines the evidentiary standard for inclusion on 
the Consolidated List as “associated with” Al-Qaida or the Taliban.123
“Associated with” is defined by clause 2 of Resolution 1617 to include: 
[P]articipating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name 
of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms 
and related materiel to; recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or 
activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, 
affiliate, splinter group or a derivative thereof.124
Several issues plague the definition.  First, “associated with” is a 
subjective criterion, not one defining a minimum standard; therefore, it is 
subject to diverse interpretations among the U.N. members.  In other words, 
different member States interpret the definition narrowly or broadly as 
applicable to their context, thereby setting their own standard for classifying 
individuals as associates of terrorists.  Some note that it has led to the 
criminalizing of entire communities.125  Connected to the broad definition is 
the issue of the ever-widening scope of the List.  Recall that initially the 
 120. See The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 16 December 2002 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1338 (Dec. 17, 
2002) (stating over 50 U.N. Member States supported listing the Jemaah Islmaiyah 
organization). 
 121. Guidelines, supra note 33, ¶ 3(a). 
 122. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31. 
 123. Id. ¶ 1. 
 124. Id. ¶ 2. 
 125. Ben Hayes, Terrorizing the Rule of Law: The Policy and Practice of 
Proscription, STATEWATCH, June 2005, http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html. 
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Committee’s mandate included listing individuals and entities associated 
with the Taliban, which was then increased to include the Al-Qaida 
organization, and lastly, by “associated with,” the scope widened further, 
unbound by geographic limitations.  The steadily widening scope has led 
U.N. members to express strong concerns.126  Some even caution that the 
notion of “associates of terrorists should not be interpreted too 
expansively.”127  Yet others insist that the criteria for identifying the 
individuals or entities targeted by sanctions should be further developed and 
refined.128  In view of these differences, the interpretation given by the 
Monitoring Team regarding “associated with” is of particular significance.  
It explicitly advises that U.N. member States interpret the “associated with” 
language broadly in submitting names, leaving it up to the Committee 
ultimately to ensure that each case fits within the scope of the sanction 
program.129
It is noteworthy that the standard of “associated with” was clarified in 
2005 by Resolution 1617,130 whereas the first resolution, Resolution 1267, 
was passed in 1999,131 and the first Consolidated List was published on 
March 8, 2001.132  Unfortunately, the Resolutions and Guidelines are 
ominously silent regarding any other evidentiary standard.  And issues of 
confidentiality have been raised to deny listed individuals the right to know 
the basis of their designation.133
Further complicating the listing issue, justifications (i.e., statement of the 
case) were not a prerequisite for listing individuals.  Given the serious 
implications of designating an individual as a terrorist or as a supporter of 
terrorism, it could be assumed that a proposal for inclusion on the List 
would be accompanied by a statement of the case providing some 
 126. See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5446th mtg., at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5446 (May 30, 
2006) (“First, the listing criteria must be further refined. In recent years, the scope of targeted 
sanctions has been extended considerably to include broad categories of individuals and 
entities . . . . [W]e believe that the criteria for identifying the individuals or entities targeted 
by sanctions could be further developed and refined.”). 
 127. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5104th mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5104 (Dec. 
17, 2004). 
 128. See generally U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5446th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5446 (May 
30, 2006). 
 129. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Briefed by Chairmen of Anti-
Terrorism Committees; Calls for Strengthened Cooperation, Enhanced Information Sharing, 
U.N. Doc. S/2005/83 (Feb. 15, 2005). 
 130. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31, ¶ 2. 
 131. See generally, S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 15. 
 132. The Consolidated List, supra note 22. 
 133. Linked to this is the issue of confidentiality.  Can the Committee raise the issue 
of confidentiality to deny a listed individual the right to know the basis of his designation?  It 
is clear that the Committee will have to find a way to balance carefully the need for 
confidentiality and the requirements of due process.  See The Res. 1267 Chairman, Briefings 
by Chairmen of Subsidiary Bodies of the Security Council, at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5375 (Feb. 
21, 2006). 
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justification, reason, basis, cause, or connection supporting the designation.  
Seemingly, providing a statement of the case when proposing a name for 
inclusion has not always been a practice; alternatively, if such a practice 
existed, the information provided was probably not adequate or sufficient.  
The continuous insistence by the Monitoring Team in most reports supports 
the observation.  Frequently it insists “that States provide, to the extent 
possible, a narrative description of the information that forms the basis or 
justification for adding a name to the List . . . .”134  Simply, the statements 
demonstrate an absence of the practice. 
The listing process is perhaps best put into context by way of an 
example. 
3. Al-Barakaat: A Case Study Elaborating the Listing Process 
A European diplomat assigned to the Security Council acknowledged: 
“In the aftermath of 9/11, there was enormous goodwill and a willingness to 
take on trust any name that the US submitted.”135  Based on trust and 
goodwill, 200 names were added to the Consolidated List post 9/11.136  This 
could be considered a significantly high number, given that over the 
following six years since 9/11 fewer than 300 were added.137  Among those 
initial 200 names three Somali-born Swedish citizens were added to the 
Consolidated List on November 9, 2001, and three days later they were 
included in the European Union’s terrorist list.138  Soon thereafter, Swedish 
 134. See The Res. 1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 14 February 2005 from the Chairman 
of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) 
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/2005/83 (Feb. 15, 2005); The Res. 
1267 Chairman, Letter Dated 7 July 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, ¶ 142, U.N. Doc. S/2003/669 (July 8, 2003) [hereinafter July 2003 Letter]
(“[S]tressed to States the importance of submitting to the Committee the names and 
identifying information, to the extent possible, of and about members of al-Qa’idah, the 
Taliban . . .  The Group believes that the provision of such information is essential to assure 
that the list remains an effective instrument.”). 
 135. Christopher Cooper, Shunned in Sweden: How Drive to Block Funds for 
Terrorism Entangled Mr. Aden – U.S. Cited Him, and the U.N. Added Economic Sanction 
With Little Public Evidence – His Checks Stop, Bills Don’t, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2002, at A1. 
 136. Rosand, supra note 47, at 749. 
 137. List composition as of May 14, 2007 was 468 (487 listed minus 19 de-listed). 
Consolidated List, 1267 Committee, The Consolidated List Established and Maintained by 
the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other 
Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them, Sept. 1, 2009, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf; De-listed, 1267 Committee, 
Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities that Have Been Removed from the 
Consolidated List Pursuant to a Decision by the 1267 Committee, Aug. 10, 2009, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/docs/Delisted.pdf. 
 138. Rosand, supra note 47, at 749. 
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financial institutions froze over $100,000 of their assets.139  The United 
States alleged that they were associated with the international hawala 
network Al-Barakaat.140  At roughly the same time, Al-Barakaat was also 
added to the Consolidated List. 
Started in 1989, Al-Barakaat was a financial and telecommunications 
organization involved in telecommunications, wire transfer services, 
internet service, construction, and currency exchange operating in over forty 
countries.141  The U.S. President, in November 2001, described the owner of 
Al-Barakaat as a “friend and supporter of Usama bin Ladin”, and the U.S. 
Secretary of Treasury described Al-Barakaat offices as “the money movers, 
the quartermasters of terror [are] . . . a principal source of funding, 
intelligence and money transfers for bin Ladin.”142  Other allegations 
included bin Laden using Al Barakaat’s 60 offices in Somalia and 127 
offices abroad to transmit funds, intelligence, and instructions to terrorist 
cells.143
Thereafter, federal agents entered eight Al-Barakaat offices in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Alexandria, Virginia; Seattle, 
Washington; and Boston, Massachusetts and seized the businesses and froze 
all accounts.144  Investigations conducted by several authorities against the 
individuals and entity took different forms. 
In the United States alone, investigations were conducted by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”), and the Office of Foreign Asset Control.145  The Senate 
Finance Committee also undertook extensive investigations, during which 
the IRS turned over tax and financial records, including donor lists of a 
dozen Muslim charities and foundations.146  Notwithstanding the 
unprecedented cooperation and complete and unfettered access to Al-
Barakaat’s financial records, the 9/11 Commission found that the links 
between Al-Barakaat and terrorism could not be substantiated.  Moreover, 
 139. Id. at 750; Cooper, supra note 135, at A1. 
 140. See generally Saul M. Froomkin, Money Laundering, Corruption and the 
Proceeds of Crime: An International Reality Check, 4 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L.
155 (2004). 
 141. See generally Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-
Money Laundering Regimes, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 45 (2004). 
 142. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
MONGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 4, 80 (2004) 
[hereinafter MONOGRAPH]. 
 143. See generally Zagaris, supra note 141; Jonathan M. Winer, & Trifin J. Roule, 
Fighting Terrorist Financing,  44 SURVIVAL 87 (2002).   
 144. MONOGRAPH, supra note 142, at 80. 
 145. Id. at 87. 
 146. Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely,  Immigration and Constitutional 
Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is 
Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609 (2005); Mohamed 
Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 28–29 (2002). 
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investigations failed to reveal the “smoking gun” evidence — either 
testimonial or documentary — showing that Al-Barakaat was funding Al-
Qaida.147  Furthermore, the government was unable to produce any evidence 
of any terrorist involvement with the charities or financial institutions, and 
by August 2002 the Minneapolis-based Al-Barakaat was cleared of 
terrorism connections.148  Last but not least, the 9/11 Commission Staff 
Report concluded that although Al-Barakaat has been commonly called a 
hawala, it is not one.149
The Swedish authorities similarly undertook investigations, and upon 
reviewing the information, they concluded that nothing would warrant a 
criminal charge against the three individuals.150  The deputy director of 
Sweden’s Foreign Affairs Ministry stated, “We discovered the sanctions 
committee didn’t have any information whatsoever when they took their 
action, just a list of names.”151
The Swedish government requested further information from both listing 
authorities.152  The U.S. Treasury responded by sending Sweden twenty-
seven pages of information to prove the allegation: the twenty-three pages 
consisted of news release material, a packet of background documents on 
Al-Barakaat, a statement by President Bush on Al-Qaida, a transcript of a 
briefing led by Secretary of State Powell, and four other pages, in all of this 
evidence the Somali Swedes were mentioned only in the flowchart of Al-
Barakaat’s structure.153  Regarding the last four pages, the Swedish 
government, without disclosing their contents, stated that it had found 
nothing in them that warranted a criminal charge against the three 
proscribed individuals.154
The government of Sweden objected to the inclusion of its citizens’ 
names on the Consolidated List and undertook the delisting process.155  In 
February 2002, twelve of the fifteen U.N. Committee members voiced a no-
objection to removing the three listed individuals; however, the United 
 147. MONOGRAPH, supra note 142, at 82. 
 148. Akram & Karmely, supra note 146; Nimer, supra note 146, at 29. 
 149. Monograph, supra note 142. 
 150. Cooper, supra note 135, at A1. 
 151. Id.
 152. The individuals were listed on the U.S. OFAC list, which is a U.S. domestic list, 
a few days before they were listed on the U.N. list.  See Dosman, supra note 47, at 15.  
Dosman notes that in October 2001, sixty-two names were added on the U.N. list.  Id.  These 
were the same names that were added to the OFAC List two days before, the point being that 
a considerable overlap between the two lists exists.  Id.
 153. Cooper, supra note 135, at A1. 
 154. Id.
 155. U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Res. 1267, Report of the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267, ¶ 11, in letter dated 
20 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1267 addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1423 (Dec. 26, 2002). 
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States, the United Kingdom, and Russia blocked and objected to their 
removal.156  After intensive bilateral discussions between the United States 
and Sweden, in August 2002 two of the three Somali Swedes were de-listed 
from the Consolidated List because they signed an undertaking with the 
U.S. government.157
According to U.S. government officials the two were delisted not 
because of the error in listing them in the first place, but because “[they] 
submitted information, evidence, sworn statements first that they had no 
knowledge that the al-Barakaat business that they were associated with were 
being used, either directly or indirectly, to finance terror.”158  And second, 
they submitted evidence, documents and sworn certification that they had 
severed all ties with Al-Barakaat and that they had disassociated themselves 
fully and completely with Al-Barakaat.159
The matter of the third proscribed individual who refused to sign the 
undertaking was adjudicated at the Court of the First Instance.  The Court 
gave its decision in October 2005.160  Meanwhile following the initial 
allegations, all offices of Al-Barakaat shut down, and the entity ceased 
operations due to the enforcement actions, freezing of funds, and adverse 
publicity.161
A similar case involved two Swiss citizens of Egyptian origin — 
Mohamed and Zeinab Mansour.  In 2001 they were listed because they were 
executive board members of Al-Taqwa, a company alleged by U.S. 
authorities to be connected with financing of terrorism.162  Upon 
investigation, the Swiss authorities determined that the allegations were 
 156. See generally Bruce Zagaris, Somali Swedes Challenge to Recent Terrorism 
Freeze Procedures 18  INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 277 (2002). 
 157. Dilshika Jayamaha, U.S. Requests Removals Off U.N. List, AP ONLINE, Aug. 22, 
2002, available at http://www.ap.org  (“The U.S. government asked that three men and three 
companies be taken off the [U.N. Sanctions] list, said Jimmy Gurule, the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s undersecretary for enforcement . . . .  He said the men were removed from the 
list because they signed pledges saying that ‘they have severed and disassociated themselves 
in every conceivable way form the Al-Barakaat-related businesses.”). 
 158. THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS 
THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 36 (2006). 
 159. Id.
 160. See Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649.  For the details of the 
judgment, see discussion of “Delisting” infra discussion pertaining to notes 197–214. 
 161. Akram, supra note 146, at 619; Nimer, supra note 146, at 29; MONOGRAPH,
supra note 142, at 103. 
 162. NOAH BIRKHÄUSER, SANCTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST 
INDIVIDUALS: SOME HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS 1 2005, http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/ 
docs/Birkhauser.pdf. 
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unfounded, and were not supported by any evidence.163  However, it took 
over six years of bilateral diplomatic initiatives to have them delisted.164
Yet another case involved an Italian citizen and Swiss resident of 
Egyptian origin whom the Committee proscribed during the first wave of 
listing posts — September 11, 2001.  Investigations by the Swiss 
Confederation failed to prove any charges and were closed after four years 
because “no elements exist to charge him . . . and the Swiss state is 
condemned to pay his lawyers and that of one of his co-workers the 
equivalent of 80,000 Euros.”165  Unfortunately, the individual remains 
proscribed on the Consolidated List. 
These are just a few instances that demonstrate the absence of standards 
or justifications in the listing process.  The Committee acted on goodwill 
and solidarity towards one Committee member to the detriment of those 
included on the List.  The deputy legal counselor of the United States 
mission to the United Nations conceded, “[T]he creation of the list was 
based largely on political trust; the committee had no particular guidelines 
or standards for States to follow in proposing names” and that, of the “some 
four hundred names on the list, the vast majority . . . were submitted by the 
United States, either alone or in conjunction with other U.N. members.”166
Evidence, such as cases and diplomatic statements, coupled with the 
Resolutions’ silence, quite clearly demonstrates the absence of standards for 
proscribing names on the Consolidated List.  As the March 30, 2006 White 
Paper presented by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown 
University, commissioned by the governments of Germany, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, entitled Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and 
Clear Procedures,167 stated: “The current procedures not only lack specific 
guidance from the respective committees on justifications for delisting, but 
they are also complicated since the criteria and concerns of the state 
originally proposing the listing are generally unknown.”168  The study 
elaborated:  
[R]ecent statements of case presented to the 1267 Committee reportedly 
vary in length and quality. At one end of the continuum, a joint submission 
 163. Id.
 164. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Removes Two 
Individuals from Consolidated list, Clarifies Corrections Made to List, U.N. Doc. SC/8613 
(Jan. 19, 2006); Jan. 2007 Letter, supra  note 69, at 11. 
 165. EUR PARL. ASS., UN Security Council Black Lists: Introductory Memorandum,
Doc. No. 14, ¶ 2 (2007). 
 166. Rosand, supra note 47, at 748; see generally Press Release, U.S. Dept. of 
Treasury, Treasury Statement on UN Terrorism Report (August 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3382.htm; Testimony of Daniel Glaser, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary (Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes) U.S. Department of the 
Treasury Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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from two Member States recommending the listing of three individuals 
allegedly included a general background on the organization with which 
they were affiliated, followed by six detailed paragraphs on each 
individual, with specific information relating to actions they have 
allegedly taken. Another statement of case proposing the listing of six 
individuals included 70 pages of faxed material, including copies of arrest 
warrants. At the other end of the spectrum was a statement of case that 
purportedly included 74 names, with only a single, general paragraph of 
justification . . . .169
The 2006 report commissioned by the Council of Europe and prepared 
by Professor Iain Cameron entitled The European Convention on Human 
Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security Council Counter-
Terrorism Sanctions170 made similar observations.  Upon considering the 
information that served as the basis of listing, it concluded, “the sanctions 
committees as such have rarely, or ever, evaluated the ‘evidence’ that the 
named person is engaged in activities involving a threat to international 
peace and security.”171
Recall that, to assist in the proscribing process, the Monitoring Team 
clarifies that administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings need not be 
brought or concluded against an individual or entity before a name is 
proposed for inclusion.172  Furthermore, neither is a criminal conviction or 
indictment a prerequisite.173  Indeed, because no evidentiary or substantive 
standards exist, the Committee, encouraging the general U.N. membership, 
States that “no reason is good enough to justify delays in the submission of 
new names.”174
The above was a description of the situation that existed in the aftermath 
of 9/11.  However, over the following six years, goodwill and the political 
trust wore thin.  And slowly, concerns emerged including the violations of 
human rights, due process, fairness, and transparency, in turn changing the 
situation.  As the different interests and concerns crystallized, the law, 
reflecting divisions, was amended. 
4. Amending the Law According to Demarked Interests 
Resolution 1526,175 when compared to Resolution 1617,176 supports the 
observation about differences among States.  While both Resolutions 
grapple with the same issue, their language is radically different.  In 
 169. Id. at 28. 
 170. CAMERON, supra note 94. 
 171. Id. at 5. 
 172. Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53, at 3. 
 173. Id.
 174. Dec. 2006 Letter, supra note 59, ¶ 10. 
 175. See generally, S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 28. 
 176. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 30. 
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Resolution 1526,177 the language is exhortative in nature: “Calls upon all 
States, when submitting new names to the Committee’s list, to include 
identifying information and background information, to the greatest possible 
extent, that demonstrates the individual(s)’ and or entity(ies)’ association 
with . . . .”178  Whereas in Resolution 1617,179 the language is mandatory in 
nature: “Decides that, when proposing names for the consolidated list, 
[S]tates shall . . . henceforth also provide to the Committee a statement of 
case describing the basis of the proposal; and further encourages [S]tates to 
identify any undertaking and entities owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the proposed subject . . . .”180
The distinction between mandatory and exhortative language lies in the 
obligatory or voluntary nature underlying the provisions.181  The wording of 
Resolution 1526 provides that obligations are voluntary in nature (i.e., 
discretion is permitted), whereas that of Resolution 1617 is mandatory and 
binding, and calls for strict compliance (i.e., States forwarding names have a 
mandatory obligation to submit a statement of case). 
5. Persistence of Severe Problems Concerning Standards and 
Justifications 
Although the mandatory obligations are certainly a positive step, the 
Resolution falls short of creating a threshold standard for justifications and 
evidence.  The listing process still lacks any substantive or evidentiary 
standards.  Equally problematic, the new guidelines essentially apply to new 
listings and do not address the previous ones; no specific mechanism has 
been established to review old listings to ensure that they meet the new 
standard.182  The first List was formulated in 2001 and published on March 
 177. See S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 28. 
 178. Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). 
 179. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31. 
 180. Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
 181. BIERSTEKER & ECKART, supra note 8, at 39–40.
 182. Security Council Report, Response in the 1267 Committee: Listing, Monthly 
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8, 2001.183  Therefore, for the earlier listings, from 2001 to 2005, the 
mandatory clause is inapplicable.  Indeed, a general review of all the listings 
would be a major undertaking because many designated individuals and 
entities were placed on the Consolidated List without the designating 
country providing the Committee with adequate supporting information and 
evidence.184
Because the Resolutions are silent regarding any other evidentiary 
standard or justification (apart from the subjective “associated with”), the 
listing process permits prosecution without stated cause.  As the Court of 
First Instance in the Swedish trial noted, “in circumstances of this case . . . it 
makes it possible for the Council to freeze the applicant’s funds indefinitely 
without giving him any opportunity to make known his views on the 
correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the 
evidence adduced against him.”185
6. A Key Issue Tied to Standards: Access to Information for 
Enforcement of Measures 
Equally alarming as the absence of evidentiary standards, the List 
enforcement requires strict compliance by the entire U.N. membership 
against their citizens without giving cause.  A feasible explanation, as noted 
previously, is that Chapter VII operations are mandatory, and therefore, 
theoretically do not require consent or approval of all U.N. members.  
However, studies have proven that operationally the practice is 
problematic,186 especially since “States often have to take action against 
parties with little or no understanding of what wrongful conduct occurred 
(or is occurring),” as the Monitoring Team notes.187
The Watson White Paper specifically identified this serious problem 
when it observed that there is typically little advance consultation with 
affected member States of residence or nationality of the listed individual, 
particularly if they are not currently serving on the Security Council.188
Only current Security Council member States, which are also the member 
States of the Sanctions Committee, receive and review statements of case, 
not the general U.N. membership189 — but, of course, it is these general 
members that are required to enforce the measure. 
 183. Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Comm. Concerning Afghanistan 
Issues List Pursuant to Paragraph 8 (c) of Resolution 1333 (2000), U.N. Doc. AFG/150-
SC/7166 (Aug. 10, 2001). 
 184. Security Council Report, supra note 182. 
 185. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-03649. 
 186. See generally DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, SANCTIONS AND THE 
SEARCH FOR SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO THE UN ACTION (2002). 
 187. Third Report, supra note 72, ¶ 30. 
 188. See generally BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 158. 
 189. Id.
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Since U.N. member States are expected to enforce sanctions “with the 
same vigour with which they approach their highest national interests,”190
without the statement of case or any evidence against the listed, States are 
facing legal challenges to blocking actions they have undertaken in 
compliance with their obligations to enforce the measures.  Faced with 
challenges, they have demanded that the Committee must provide them with 
the information to which they are entitled concerning persons whose names 
are listed and anything relevant to their listing or delisting.191  The 
Monitoring Team similarly advised the Committee, although for a different 
reason, “so allowing States, depending upon the scope of their laws, to 
impose criminal penalties for any subsequent violations.”192
In a positive, albeit narrow, development, Resolution 1617 authorized 
the release of statements of case under certain circumstances.193
Acknowledging the development — i.e., its importance vis-à-vis fairness, 
transparency, and effective implementation of measures — the Watson 
study urged the preparation of a redacted statement of case, which does not 
disclose confidential information but provides the requesting party (a State 
or the proscribed person or entity) with information regarding the basis of 
the measures imposed.194  However, it is unclear if the recommendation has 
been accepted. 
Intrinsically connected to the above-noted limitations, from the 
perspective of enforcement of the List, is another problematic issue — that 
of identifiers. 
7. Lack of Specific Identifiers for Individuals 
Linked to the issue of justifications is the contentious issue of identifiers 
to distinguish individuals.  A serious deficiency with the Consolidated List 
is that numerous names lack identifiers.  Enforcement, as required by States 
and the previously noted reporting entities, is based on providing 
information about the listed individuals.  Theoretically, it may be assumed 
that if a name is included on the List, it is accompanied by the information 
required to enforce the measure.  However, the assumption is incorrect, 
since identifiers are not a prerequisite for listing. 
The Monitoring Team elucidates the problem — of the 182 individuals 
on the Consolidated List who are deemed associated with Al-Qaida, only 92 
(51%) are clearly linked by address to any State; of the 116 listed entities 
belonging to or associated with Al-Qaida, only the location of 75 (65%) is 
recorded.  The List also contains twenty entities with addresses in Somalia, 
 190. Dec. 2006 Letter, supra note 59, ¶ 20. 
 191. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5446th mtg., supra note 56, at 25. 
 192. Third Report, supra note 72, ¶ 29. 
 193. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 31, ¶ 6; Third Report, supra note 72. 
 194. BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 158, at 29. 
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where there is no central authority capable of implementing the sanctions 
nor a banking system able to freeze assets.195
The lack of identifiers is a serious obstacle to enforcement.  Quite 
simply, it is impossible to enforce the List without the relevant identifying 
information.  Numerous U.N. member States have expressed this concern.  
As the Monitoring Team reports, “Sixty-five member States have said that 
sanctions cannot be implemented against certain entries on the List without 
sufficient identifiers.”196
Notwithstanding the consistent requests and encouragement from the 
Committee,197 the reluctance of the general membership to forward names 
for the List (being overcome by a “reporting-fatigue”),198 or alternately, to 
provide identifiers for already listed names, evidences evolving 
relationships among U.N. members and/or differing views of dealing with 
issues of terrorism, apart from tensions arising from the absence of 
substantive standards, justifications, identifiers, and the lack of transparency 
surrounding the complete listing process. 
The above description makes clear the serious issues and limitations of 
the List and listing process.  However, formidable as these issues are, they 
pale in comparison to the profoundly problematic issues that engulf 
delisting, as the following analysis elaborates. 
B. Delisting Process 
1. Standards 
Similar to the listing process (with the exception of the subjective 
“associated with”), the Resolutions and Committee Guidelines are 
ominously silent regarding the standards and criteria for delisting.  Quite 
simply, the process is devoid of standards. 
The Watson study noted that the criteria for delisting is “[u]nspecified.”  
Furthermore, it stated, “[m]ore specific guidance as to what constitutes an 
adequate justification for delisting and the degree of information required is 
not available . . . .  The current procedures not only lack specific guidance 
from the . . . [Committee] on justifications for delisting, but they are also 
 195. Third Report, supra note 72, ¶ 65. 
 196. Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53, at 2; see also U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5375th 
mtg., supra note 56; July 2003 Letter, supra note 134, ¶ 164. 
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in letter dated 20 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and 
Associated Individuals and Entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2006/1047 (Dec. 28, 2006); see  U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5538th mtg., supra note 56, 
at 4; U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5168th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5168 (Apr. 25, 2005) 
(statement of Security Council President Guangya, China). 
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complicated since the criteria and concerns of the State originally proposing 
the listing are generally unknown.”199
2. Procedure 
The delisting process is immeasurably arduous and problematic.  To 
delist an individual or entity, States “negotiate bilaterally”200 among 
themselves.  That is to say, the process is a confidential and bilateral (State-
to-State) delisting procedure that relies on diplomatic protection of 
individuals as the sole remedy for initiating delisting requests.201
According to Committee Guidelines, the procedure for delisting is as 
follows: a petitioner first requests the government of citizenship or 
residence to review the case.  The petitioned government, upon review (e.g., 
independent investigations), holds bilateral consultations with the originally 
proposing State (assuming it is not the proposing State itself), and then 
forwards the request to the Committee.  Decisions to delist are then made by 
consensus of all fifteen members.202
Some controversial aspects of the process are: (a) until 2006 the delisting 
process could be undertaken only by a State of residence or citizenship and 
not by any other State (i.e., only residence or citizenship States had 
standing) and (b) the listed individuals or their legal representatives had no 
standing.203  Perhaps the most contentious issue is that the Committee is the 
sole and final authority pertaining to all delisting issues — no independent 
review mechanism exists (i.e., even to review a delisting request). 
The issue of standing is complicated.  If a State of residence or 
citizenship was originally the State that proposed the listing, or if a State is 
not sympathetic for any reason, quite naturally, a proscribed individual’s or 
entity’s request may fail to receive fair or adequate consideration.  Neither 
are U.N. member States obligated by any Resolution to assist, ascertain, or 
forward petitions to the Committee.  Nor do any Resolutions require U.N. 
member States to inform the Committee about receiving a delisting request. 
It is commendable that U.N. members have undertaken the delisting 
process and certain individuals and entities have been delisted (nineteen as 
of April 20, 2007); however, no information is available regarding the 
number of requests received or declined, or about investigations conducted 
by any U.N. member.  Perhaps a feasible explanation for the lack of the 
information is that no Resolutions address this issue.  However, due to the 
Resolutions’ omissions, coupled with the lack of mechanisms to ensure that 
 199. BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 158, at 38. 
 200. Id. at 37. 
 201. Id.
 202. Guidelines, supra note 33, ¶ 3(a). 
 203. However, on December 19, 2006, via Resolution 1730 (2006) the Security 
Council established a Focal Point to receive de-listing requests.  See S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006). 
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U.N. members forward petitions for delisting to the Committee, the 
proscribed are resorting to the conventional forums of justice.  For example, 
in 2005 a Brussels court directed the government of Belgium to petition the 
United Nations for delisting because two listed applicants had not been 
criminally indicted after a lengthy investigation.204
Theoretically, it may be argued that the delisting process is narrowly 
defined to prevent the listed individuals from forum shopping (i.e., 
approaching another State that is sympathetic, assuming the lack of support 
from the country of citizenship/residence).  But the counter-argument from 
an operational perspective is clearly more persuasive.  Because the consent 
of all fifteen Committee members is required for delisting, without the 
support of the country of citizenship, delisting is simply infeasible.  In any 
case, the Monitoring Team has proposed that petitions always be forwarded 
to the Committee, with an approval, objection, or neutral position from the 
relevant State.205  It is unclear if the recommendation has been accepted. 
More problematic is the fact that the Committee is the exclusive entity 
exercising absolute authority vis-à-vis the listed and no other forum exists 
for the listed to be heard.206  Committee decisions are not subject to any 
review on any grounds (procedural or substantive) by any independent 
forum.  Thus, the narrow process could be one of the many reasons for the 
mere nineteen delistings by the Committee from 1999 to 2007, and also for 
the numerous cases pending in various courts and different jurisdictions 
regarding the measures.207  Essentially, the process offers the listed no
options for review of the Committee’s decision. 
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CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 at 5 (2008). 
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4, U.N. Doc. S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/26 (Apr. 17, 2003) (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief 
and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002). 
The Team is aware of 15 lawsuits filed in five Member States, as 
well as before the European Court of Justice, challenging Member 
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The lack of options was further stressed in the Somali Swedish case, 
wherein the Court of the First Instance observed that the applicant had first 
approached the Committee directly, then sought the assistance of the Saudi 
Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in asserting his rights before the 
Committee, and finally, took steps to make representations to the U.S. 
Office of Foreign Asset Control.  In each instance, the Court noted, the 
matter was deferred to the Sanctions Committee.  Furthermore, it reiterated 
that the U.N. Security Council Resolutions were consonant with norms of 
jus cogens and that these rules have a higher status, are nonderogable, and 
are binding on all subjects of international law, including U.N. bodies.  
Therefore, the Court itself was bound by the U.N. Charter and, in principle, 
the matter was beyond its scope.208
Additionally, apart from the proscribed having no options, U.N. member 
States, too, have limited options in the delisting process.  Those familiar 
(e.g., Swedish authorities) with the process describe it as very difficult and 
“unacceptably drawn out.”209  The Cameron study elaborates that the 
delisting procedure contains no possibility for the petitioning State to 
compel the production of sufficient information, or any information 
whatsoever, justifying the blacklisting of one of its nationals or residents.  
The designating State can refuse to provide any information and continue to 
block the removal from the List, and the petitioning State cannot force a 
determination of the issue before an objective body.210
Lastly, the delisting procedure is problematic for yet other reasons — 
none of which, unfortunately, are addressed in the Resolutions or 
Guidelines.  For example, the procedure does not extend to deceased 
individuals.  Should the name of a deceased person be removed from the 
List or not?  Since it is a contentious issue (i.e., it may be argued that the 
estate of the deceased maybe used for criminal purposes; or conversely, that 
since the person is no longer alive it is appropriate to delist the deceased), a 
gridlock exists.  A State proposed, in September 2004, that the Committee 
delist an individual who was reported dead, but the request failed, 
apparently owing to the lack of an agreed procedure on whether and how to 
delist persons who are deceased.211  Neither do any reports reveal if the 
Committee has dealt with issues regarding ownership of assets or the effect 
on beneficiaries of the listed.  Importantly, the delisting process does not 
States’ implementation of some aspect of the sanctions. Other cases 
have been filed or decided in several other countries that, while not 
challenging the sanctions, involve individuals or entities on the 
Consolidated List. 
Dec. 2005 Letter, supra note 53, ¶ 37. 
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extend to issues of wrongful listing or even ancillary issues regarding 
payment of compensation for damages.  Finally, designations are open-
ended, lacking any option for periodic reviews, making the listing a punitive 
“de facto confiscation of assets.”212
Perhaps in response to these issues, on December 19, 2006 the Focal 
Point was created by Security Council Regulation 1730 to receive delisting 
requests.213  Initially the mechanism effectuated the impression of an 
introduction of due process rights and, equally relevant, of limiting the 
exercise of absolute discretion by the Committee in delisting issues, since 
the U.N. Secretariat is formally involved in the delisting process.214
However, the reality is vastly different because in practice the Focal Point 
mechanism is devoid of any purpose or power apart from being a mere 
conduit for the exchange of information between parties — the listed 
individual and the Committee — with absolute control over the process and 
decisions retained exclusively by the Committee.  In any case, 
administratively, the function — that is, forwarding delisting petitions to the 
Committee — was informally vested with the Secretariat prior to the 
creation of the Focal Point.  The only new development concerning the 
Focal Point is that a listed individual has standing to request delisting, but as 
noted previously, without the essential support of a State, little can be 
achieved by standing per se.  Apart from these core limitations, several 
additional problems surround the Focal Point mechanism. 
Some U.N. members note that the Focal Point fails to “meet the 
minimum standard required to ensure fair and clear procedure.”215  Others 
question the mechanism’s “independence, effectiveness, neutrality[,] and 
ability to provide effective recourse” to a petitioner216 because “legal 
principles and procedures, transparency, applicable legal standards, the rule 
of law, human rights and peremptory norms” have been largely ignored 
while creating this mechanism.217
The foregoing explains the severe limitations of the listing and delisting 
process.  Simply, both processes are devoid of substantive and procedural 
standards.  And despite the creation of the Focal Point mechanism, 
operationally, the situation remains unchanged. 
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CONCLUSION
I have described the fundamental problems with the Consolidated List 
and the U.N. Sanctions Committee that formulates the instrument.  The 
Consolidated List is an extremely powerful, punitive, far-reaching, and 
statutorily limitless tool with profoundly severe consequences for the 
proscribed, the indirectly affected, and the enforcing States.  The evolving 
reach and scope highlight the importance of the instrument.  Unfortunately, 
unlimited problems plague virtually all aspects of the listing and delisting 
process.  
Perhaps the most critical is an absence of listing and delisting standards 
and lack of due process rights, as aptly stated by the U.N. Human Rights 
Commissioner: 
− Respect for due process rights: Individuals affected by a United Nations 
listing procedure effectively are essentially denied the right to a fair 
hearing; 
− Standards of proof and evidence in listing procedures: While targeted 
sanctions against individuals clearly have a punitive character, there is no 
uniformity in relation to evidentiary standards and procedures; 
− Notification: Member States are responsible for informing their nationals 
that they have been listed, but often this does not happen. Individuals have 
a right to know the reasons behind a listing decision, as well as the 
procedures available for challenging a decision; 
− Time period of individual sanctions: Individual listings normally do not 
include an “end date” to the listing, which may result in a temporary freeze 
of assets becoming permanent. The longer an individual is on a list, the 
more punitive the effect will be; 
− Accessibility: Only States have standing in the current United Nations 
sanctions regime, which assumes that the State will act on behalf of the 
individual. In practice, often this does not happen and individuals are 
effectively excluded from a process which may have a direct punitive 
impact on them; and 
− Remedies: There is a lack of consideration to remedies available to 
individuals whose human rights have been violated in the sanctions 
process.218
 218. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/88 (Mar. 9, 2007). 
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As the Fassbender study noted, the United Nations would contradict 
itself by constantly admonishing its member States to respect human rights, 
but refusing to respect the same rights in relation to its own actions.219
Unfortunately, the contradiction remains unsolved. 
Given the severity of the measure and infinitum issues that surround its 
formulation, the approach of compiling a terrorist and terrorist-financing list 
is itself questionable, more so given the results of the measure.  
Notwithstanding the frequently used justification, namely that the 
Committee and the List function for “the greater public good of preventing 
funding of terrorism,”220 the result stands in stark contrast, further 
demonstrating the profound limitations of the instrument. 
A December 31, 2004 report concerning the result states that “the 
assessment gives a nuanced picture of the current level of 
implementation.”221  Regarding the travel ban, the report states: “In the five 
years the travel ban has been in place, not a single individual is reported to 
have been stopped at a border as a consequence of being on the 
Committee’s list.”222  Regarding the arms embargo, the report states: “As 
with the travel ban, the Committee notes that no cases of enforcement of the 
arms embargo have been reported to the Committee.”223
Another report was equally unimpressive:  
[Although] thirty-four Member States have reported freezing assets under 
the financial and economic assets sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council, in some cases it has been hard to tell what this means. It is not 
clear from all reports of asset freezing, for example, what those assets are, 
their value, or who owns them. No State has reported stopping anyone on 
the Committee Consolidated List from traveling, or reported taking action 
against them in respect of the arms embargo.224
The September 2006 Report followed the familiar pattern:  
According to information provided by Member States, as of late July 2006, 
$91.4 million, mainly in the form of bank accounts, had been frozen by 35 
 219. FASSBENDER, supra note 86.   
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Although 32 Member States (24%) reported freezing assets, their 
reports gave little detail of the assets concerned. It is difficult to 
know therefore whether the frozen assets are bank accounts or 
whether they include assets of another form, such as shares or other 
property. It is not possible from the reports to identify trends with 
regard to the kind of assets being held for the direct or indirect 
benefit of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 
Id. ¶ 30. 
 222. Id. at 4. 
 223. Id.
 224. Aug. 2004 Letter, supra note 71. 
266 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:2
Member States under the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime . . . .  [T]here 
have been two very distinct periods in the history of the assets freeze: the 
initial crackdown following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 
September 2001, and the subsequent period from mid-2002. The great 
majority of the assets reported as frozen were identified in the initial 
period; since then the amount has hardly changed, despite several 
additions and amendments to the List.225
Given these dismal results and the unlimited unresolved issues that 
encase all formulation aspects, any achievement is debatable.  Though 
proscribing is a relatively recent unprecedented practice in the history of the 
United Nations, due to the enormous negative consequences and infinite 
limitations of the practice, it is highly desirable that the international 
community revisit the approach and practice. 
 225. U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Res. 1267, Fifth Report of the 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Resolutions 1526
and 1617 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, ¶¶ 
59, 61, U.N. Doc. S/2006/750 (Sept. 20, 2006). 
